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Why G6del Didn't Have Church's Thesis* 
MARTIN DAVIS 
Courant Institute, New York, New York 10012 
To celebrate the occasion of the twentieth anniversary meeting on Foun- 
dations of Computer Science, in October 1979, it was held at a very special 
location, San Juan, Puerto Rico, and three distiguished pioneers of 
theoretical computer science, Sheila Greibach, Juris Hartmanis, and Stephen 
C. Kleene were invited to give addresses on the history of the field. The 
present article was directly stimulated by my hearing Kleene's thoroughly 
delightful talk "Origins of Recursive Function Theory," which is now 
available in printed form (Kleene, 1981). It was my great good fortune to 
have been, during the late 1940s, a student of two of the most important 
early workers in the field of recursive function theory, Alonzo Church and 
Emil Post. Later, I edited an anthology (Davis, 1965) of basic papers in the 
field and marvelled at the richness of the interactions among the remarkable 
community of logicians that historical crosscurrents had brought o the East 
coast of the United States, and especially to Princeton, New Jersey, in the 
1930s. It is truly remarkable (G6del, 1946, speaks of a "kind of miracle") 
that it has proved possible to give a pecise mathematical characterization f
the class of processes that can be carried out by purely mechanical means. It 
is in fact the possibility of such a characterization that underlies the 
ubiquitous applicability of digital computers. In addition it has made it 
possible to prove the algorithmic unsolvability of important problems, has 
provided a key tool in mathematical logic, has made available an array of 
fundamental models in theoretical computer science, and has been the basis 
of a rich new branch of mathematics. Kleene's account, which is particularly 
valuable bacause he is able to write as one of the key participants in the 
unfolding drama, restimulated my interest in the early history of these ideas. 
Another source of stimulation was the appearance of Webb (1980), a 
provocative philosophical and historical study of Church's thesis at an 
unusually deep level. I am very grateful for the extremely helpful criticisms, 
corrections, and new historical material provided by Kleene after reading a 
preliminary version of this article, although, of course, responsibility for the 
opinions expressed is entirely my own. 
* Work supported by National Science Foundation Grant MCS-8002438. This article is 
part of the NSF sponsored Workshop on Recursion Theoretic Aspects of Computer Science 
held at Purdue University in May 1981. 
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1. ).-DEFINABILITY 
The work of Church, Kleene, and Rosser in the early 1930s was largely in 
the context of the ).-calculus. The idea of the ),-notation is familiar to most 
computer scientists. 1 (Thus) .x [x  2] denotes the "squaring function", and 
{).x[x 2]}(3) denotes the number 9.) It was incorporated by John McCarthy 
into his LISP, and has been employed in var ious studies of programming 
languages. More recently it has been fundamental in the development of so- 
called denotational semantics. The ).-notation was developed by Church as 
part of an attempt o produce a logical system which would be adequate for 
ordinary mathematics in which the notion of function or mapping Would 
play a fundamental role. Since the ).-operator converts an expression 
containing free variables into one which denotes a function, the ).-notation 
arose out of this project in a very natural way. Church published a pair of 
substantial papers 2 on the system he developed and set his students Stephen 
C. Kleene and J. Barkley Rosser to work on it. Their work was extremely 
effective, if not exactly what one dreams of having one's graduate students 
accomplish for one: Kleene and Rosser proved that Church's system was 
invonsistent! 3 Although this ended Church's hopes for his ambitious system, 
it seemed that it should not be the end for something as natural and elegant 
as the ).-notation. In fact it turned out to be possible to extract a 
demonstraby consistent subsystem of Church's system, the ).-calculus. 4 The 
).-calculus is developed using rules of ).-conversion by means of which 
expressions of the ).-calculus may be transformed in such a manner that the 
object an expression intuitively denotes remains unchanged under 
conversion. (An example would be {).x[x 2] }(3) which can be "converted" to 
32. Other rules would permit conversion of) .x[x 2] into ).y[y2] and of 32 into 
{).x[x2]}(3). This example is not quite right because x 2 and 3 are not 
expressions of the "pure" ).-calculus, but it serves to give the idea, and in any 
case, as will be clear shortly, the missing items can be introduced by 
definition.) Church had proposed to develop arithmetic within his system by 
using suitable ).-expressions to code the positive integers. His code, which 
had particular technical advantages, was as follows: 
For those unfamiliar with the )~-notation, Kleene (1981) contains a brief and excellent 
intuitive introduction and further eferences. See in particular Church (1935). 
2 For references, see Kleene (1981). 
3 The list of logicians who have seriously proposed systems of logic that have later turned 
out to be inconsistent reads like an honor roll. It includes, in addition to Church: Frege, 
Curry, Quine, and Rosser. 
4 See Church (1935). Actually there are several X-calculi which are minor variants of one 
another. 
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1 stands for 2x[2y[{x}](y)]], 
2 stands for 2x[2y[{x}({x}(y))]], 
3 stands for 2x[2y[{x}({x}({x}(y)))]], 
etc. Using this coding or abbreviation, we may say that an expression M of 
the 2-calculus 2-defines the (total) function f from the positive integers to the 
positive integers if the expression {M}(n) is convertible by the rules of 2- 
conversion into f(n) for each positive integer n. Similarly a function f of two 
variables is ).-defined by M if {{M}(m)}(n) is convertible to f(m, n) for all 
positive integers m, n, and similarly for functions of three or more variables. 
A function is then k-definable if there is some k-expression which k-defines it. 
This definition is all but inevitable in the present context; Kleene (1981, 
p. 55) says, ". . .  we cannot escape ]it]." It seems to have developed out of 
Kleene's realization in 1932 that he could prove one of Peano's postulates in 
Church's system if he could find an expression which k-defines the 
predecessor function, and Church (1936, footnote 3; Davis, 1965, p. 90) 
credits the notion of k-definability "jointly to [Church] and S. C. Kleene." 
Kleene quickly succeeded in showing that the predecessor function is 4- 
definable. Church's original intuition for the extent of the class of k-definable 
functions was such that Kleene's result (1981, p. 57) surprised him. But 
Kleene soon showed that the class was very extensive indeed, containing all 
primitive recursive functions and being closed under minimalization. It was 
easy to transform any Z-expression which k-defines a function into an 
explicit algorithm for computing that function. The decisive step was to 
declare that the converse was likewise true, that any mechanically calculable 
function was indeed k-definable. 
2. GENERAL RECURSIVE FUNCTIONS 
The class of what are now called primitive recursive functions was 
introduced in 1931 by G6del in his epoch-making paper on undecidable 
propositions, where he called them simply "rekursiv." Previously, Dedekind, 
Peano, and Skolem among others had studied recursive definitions. Hilbert 
had suggested the use of more general kinds of recursions (e.g., on more than 
one variable simulatenously) and Ackermann followed up on this suggestion 
by using such a recursive definition to construct his famous example of a 
function which is not primitive recursive. In the period February to May 
1934, G6del gave a series of lectures at the Institute for Advanced Study in 
Princeton which have been preserved in the lecture notes taken by Kleene 
and Rosser (G6del, 1934). In these lectures G6del (1934; Davis, 1965, 
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pp. 43, 44) 5 noted that primitive recursive functions "have the important 
property that, for each given set of values of the arguments, the value of the 
function can be computed by a finite procedure." To this remark G6del 
(1934, footnote 3; Davis, 1965, p. 44) added the suggestive footnote 6
The converse seems to be true, if besides [primitive] recursions .-. recursions of 
other forms (e.g., with respect o two variables imultaneously) are admitted. This 
cannot be proved, since the notion of finite computation is not defined, but it serves 
as a heuristic principle. 
We may refer to 
G6DEL'S THESIS. 7 Every mechanically calculable function can be defined 
using recursions of the most general kind. 
Later in the same lectures, G6del (1934, Davis, 1965, p. 69), following up 
on a suggestion of Jacques Herbrand, proposed an answer to the question of 
"what one would mean by 'every recursive function'." This answer 
anticipated the notion of "recursive" as used by computer scientists as in 
recursive programs. The idea is to permit definition of a function by using 
equations connecting values of the function with other values of the same 
function and of other functions in the most general conceivable manner. It is 
only required (this last was essentially G6del's addition to Herbrand's 
conception) that values of the function be derivable from the equations using 
only the simplest rules of substitution. The idea should be clear from a pair 
of examples. First consider the four equations 
o(x, O) = x, 
o(x, Sy) = SG(x, y), 
~(x, O) -- O, 
~(x, Sy) = ~(~(x, y), x). 
Here S stands for successor and we are using the primitive notation S ... SO 
for natural numbers. These equations give a recursive definition of 
multiplication. Here is a derivation of 2 • 2 = 4 from these equations: 
5 I am indebted to Kleene for the information that G6del's lectures took place in the period 
February through May 1934. In correspondence, Kleene stated: "... the cover page of my 
original set of G6del's notes reads 'Notes on lectures by KURT GI3DEL February May, 
1934'." 
6 The word "primitive" in brackets has been added in accord with contemporary usage. 
v Webb (1980, pp. 186, 188, 203) properly emphasizes the roots of this "thesis" in the ideas 
of Skolem and Hilbert. 
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o(o, sso) = sa(o, so) 
= ssG(o, o) 
= SSO,  
~(sso, so) : G(~(sso, o), sso) 
= o(o, sso) 
= SSO,  
~r(sso, sso) = so(sso, so) 
: ss~(sso,  o) 
= SSSSO,  
~(sso, sso) = ~(~(sso, so), sso) 
: G(sso, sso) 
= SSSSO.  
Of course multiplication is primitive recursive and we have just used the 
ordinary primitive recursive definitions of addition and multiplication. In the 
following more revealing example, 8 it is assumed that the three equations we 
are writing follow a list of equations which permit calculation of the values 
of p: 
a(O, x, y) = y, 
G(Sz, x, y) : G(p(x, Sy), x, Sy), 
O(x) : o(p(x, o), x, o). 
It is not difficult to see that if the full set of equations is used to calculate 
values of ¢, then the function obtained is 
miny[p(x, y) = 0]. 
A precise definition of general recursive functions of course requires that 
the details be filled in some precise manner. G6del in his lectures filled in the 
details in one particular way. Later Kleene (1936) showed that the class of 
functions obtained was not at all sensitive to the details of the definition. 
When I was preparing the anthology, Davis (1965), it seemed to me that 
G6del's footnote above (which I have paraphrased as G6del's thesis) 
together with his proposed definition of general recursive function in the 
same lectures amounted to a precise characterization of the mechanically 
calculable functions and hence to a statement of Church's thesis. I suggested 
as much in a first draft of my brief introduction to G6del's lectures, and 
8 Due to Kleene (1936a, 1943); see Davis (1965, pp. 247, 259). 
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submitted the draft to G6del for his comments. In a reply, dated February 
15, 1965, G6del took strong exception to my suggestion. He wrote: 
• .. it is not true that footnote 3is a statement of Church's Thesis. The conjecture 
stated there only refers to the equivalence of ~'finite (computation) procedure" and 
"recursive procedure." However, I was, at the time of these lectures, not at all 
convinced that my concept of recursion comprises all possible recursions; and in 
fact the equivalence b tween my definition and Kleene's 9 .-. is not quite trivial. 
In the light of G6del's letter we can clearly characterize Gfdel 's views 
during the spring of 1934, He believed "G6del's Thesis" as a heuristic guide 
and had even attempted a definition of "general recursive" function. But he 
was still "not at all convinced" that his definition was sufficiently inclusive. 
3. CHURCH'S THESIS 
In the published version of his 1979 address, Kleene (1981, p. 59) states 1° 
The concept of 2-definability existed full-fledged by the fall of 1933 and was 
circulating among the logicians at Princeton. Church had been speculating, and 
finally definitely proposed, that the 2-definable functions are all the effectively 
calculable functions .... When Church proposed this thesis, I sat down to disprove it
by diagonalizing out of the class of the 2-definable functions. But, quickly realizing 
that the diagonalization cannot be done effectively, I became overnight a supporter 
of the thesis. 
Kleene has explained (in personal correspondence) that he did not intend this 
account to place Church's "definite proposal" in the fall of 1933. Kleene 
states that "all of these events... (except Church's earliest speculations)" took 
place after Kleene's return to Princeton on February 7, 1934, and before 
something like the end of March 1934. Since G6del's lectures at the Institute 
for Advanced Study were taking place during the period Febrary through 
May 1934, Church's statement of his "thesis" occurred either just before 
these lectures began or while they were in progress. 
In tracing the development of Church's ideas, it is interesting to consider 
an address entitled "The Richard Paradox" (Church, 1934) which Church 
delivered in December 1933. We quote from Church's address 
The Richard paradox can be said to consist in the following problem. How is it 
possible that a system of symbolic logic, in which the set of all formulas is 
enumerable, should be adequate for any branch of mathematics which deals with 
the members of a non-enumerable set... ?
9 That is, in Kleene (1936a). 
~0 Kleene suggests, as a clarification of the chronology, adding the words "in 1934" at the 
beginning of his line 4 from the bottom, left-hand column. 
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Given a system of symbolic logic, let us try to construct the function of positive 
integers such that there is no formula in the system that stands for it. What we 
must do is first to enumerate all formulas, and then, going through this 
enumeration, to pick out in order those formulas which stand for functions of 
positive integers. The result is an enumeration of all formulas which stand for 
functions of positive integers. And if we let f , (x)  be the function of positive integers 
represented by the nth formula in this enumeration, then 1 + fx(x) is the function of 
positive integers uch that there is no formula in the system that stands for it. 
But this function 1 +fx(X) is not, in general, defined in such a way that it is 
always possible to calculate its value for a given positive integer x. For, in the 
process of going through the list of all formulas and picking out those which stand 
for functions of positive integers, we may at some stage find a formula about which 
we do not know whether or not it stands for a function of positive integers. 
... Indeed, to be sure of always being able to determine whether a given formula 
stands for a function of positive integers, we must have discovered a method of 
procedure which would enable us to solve any problem of number theory whatever. 
Therefore the infinite sequence (about which we have been talking) of all formulas 
which stand for functions of positive integers almost certainly is not such an infinite 
sequence that it is possible to calculate as many terms of it as we please. And 
therefore the function 1 +fx(x) has not been defined in a way which could be 
called constructive, but has merely been proved by an indirect argument to exist. 
(Church 1934, pp. 357-358) 
Although Church's keen interest in effective calculability is evident and he is 
clearly aware of the relevance of the diagonal construction, there is no hint 
that he proposed to identify effective calculability with some precise 
mathematical notion. 
In a letter to Kleene I1 dated November 29, 1935, Church gives a 
fascinating account of his discussion of effective calculability with G6del, 
presumably early in 1934. 
In regard to G6del and the notions of recursiveness and effective calculability, 
the history is the following. In discussion [sic] with him the notion of lambda- 
definability, it developed that there was no good definition of effective caleulability. 
My proposal that lambda-definability be taken as a definition of it he regarded as 
thoroughly unsatisfactory. I replied that if he would propose any definition of 
effective calculability which seemed even partially satisfactory I would undertake to 
prove that it was included in lambda-definability. His only idea at the time was that 
it might be possible, in terms of effective calculability as an undefined notion, to 
state a set of axioms which would embody the generally accepted properties of this 
notion, and to do something on that basis. Evidently it occurred to him later that 
Herbrand's definition of recursiveness, which has no regard to effective 
calculability, could be modified in the direction of effective calculability, and he 
made this proposal in his lectures. At that time he did specifically raise the question 
of the connection between recursiveness in this new sense and effective calculability, 
but said he did not think that the two ideas could be satisfactorily identified "except 
heuristically." 
~ A copy of this letter was supplied to me by Kleene. Kleene (1981, p. 59) gives a shorter 
excerpt from this letter. 
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Church's announcement to the mathematical world of this "thesis" was at 
a meeting of the Americal Mathematical Society in New York City on April 
19, 1935 in a ten minute contributed talk. We quote in full the abstract 
(Church, 1935) of that paper (received by the Society on March 22, 1935). 
Following a suggestion of Herbrand, but modifying it in an important respect, 
G6del has proposed (in a set of lectures at Princeton, N. J., 1934) a definition of 
the term recursive function, in a very general sense. In this paper a definition of 
reeursivefunction of positive integers which is essentially G6del's is adopted. And it 
is maintained that the notion of an effectively calculable function of positive 
integers should be identified with that of a recursive function, since other plausible 
definitions of effective calculability turn out to yield notions which are either 
equivalent toor weaker than recursiveness. There are many problems of elementary 
number theory in which it is required to find an effectively calculable function of 
positive integers atisfying certain conditions, as well as a large number of  
problems in other fields which are known to be reducible to problems in number 
theory of this type. A problem of this class is the problem to find a complete set of 
invariants of formulas under the operation of conversion (see abstract 41-5-204). It
is proved that this problem is unsolvable, in the sense that there is no complete set 
of effectively calculable invariants. 
Thus, Church chose to state his thesis not in terms of ),-definability, but 
rather in terms of "Herbrand-G6del  general recursiveness." It is interesting 
that ),-definability occurs only by implication in the reference to "other 
plausible definitions of effective calculability.., either equivalent to or weaker 
than recursiveness."The wording leaves the impression that in the early 
spring of 1935 Church was not yet certain that 2-definability and Herbrand-  
G6del general recursiveness were equivalent. (This despite Church's letter of 
November 1935 in which he reported that in the spring of 1934 he had 
offered to G6del to prove that "any definition of effective calculability which 
seemed even partially satisfactory.., was included in lambda-definability.") 
The full paper (Church, 1936) which appeared in the April 1936 issue of the 
American Journal of Mathematics does not contradict his impression. The 
fact that avery 2-definable function is recursive is there said to have been 
obtained by Church and by Kleene "independently... at about the same 
time," whereas the converse is attributed to Kleene. In fact, an abstract of 
Kleene (1936b) which announced th equivalence of 2-definability and recur- 
siveness was received by the American Mathematical Society on July i, 
1935. ~2 Also received on July 1, 1935 was an abstract of Kleene (1936a) 
which contained Kleene's famous 
~2Kleene (1981, p. 60) mistakenly asserts that Church (1936) also contains uch an 
equivalence proof; Kleene suggests he correction: on page 60, line 17, left hand column, omit 
the words "Church (1936) and" and change "equivalence proofs" to "an equivalence proof." 
Kleene also lists four additional errata: Page 52, right-hand column, add at the end of line 5 
the words "the first of' so that what is said "might not be taken as implying incorrectly that 
G6del's second theorem was announced at the K6nigsberg conference." Page 57, left-hand 
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NORMAL FORM THEOREM. Every general recursive function can be 
expressed in the form f(miny(g(x I ..... x , ,  y )= 0)), where f and g are 
primitive recursive functions. 
This theorem has made equivalence proofs for formalisms in recursive 
function theory rather routine, and must have gone a considerable distance 
towards convincing G6del that his "concept of recursion" indeed "comprises 
all possible recursions." That Church and Kleene did not have the results 
Kleene (1936a, b) available at the time of the April 1935 meeting is also 
suggested by the fact that Kleene, whose name is included in the published 
list of those attending that meeting, did not give at least one of these papers 
at the meeting. 
Of course, by the time the final version of Church (1936) was written, 
Church was fully aware of the equivalence of 2-definability and recur- 
siveness, and he was able to argue forcefully that 
The fact, however, that two such widely different and (in the opinion of the 
author) equally natural definitions of effective calculability turn out to be 
equivalent adds to the strength of the reasons addressed below for believing that 
they constitute as general a characterization f this notion as is consistent with the 
usual intuitive nderstanding understanding of it. (Church, 1936; Davis, 1965, p. 90) 
However, recursiveness continues to get top billing even in the published 
version which contains this "official" statement of Church's thesis: 
We now define the notion, already discussed, ofan effectively calculable function 
of positive integers by identifying it with the notion of a recursive function of 
positive integers (or of a k-definable function of positive integers). This definition is 
thought o be justified by the considerations which follow, so far as positive 
justification can every be obtained for the selection of a formal definition to 
correspond to an intuitive notion. (Church, 1936; Davis, 1965, p. 100) 
In a footnote to the just cited paragraph, Church briefly alludes to a conver- 
sation with G6del which evidentally occurred after the discussion mentioned 
in his letter to Kleene. 
The question of the relationship between effective calculability and recursiveness 
(which it is here proposed to answer by identifying the two notions) was raised by 
G6del in conversation with the author. The corresponding question of the 
relationship between effective calculability and k-definability had previously been 
proposed by the author independently. 
We can now summarize. In the early months of 1934, Church (1936; 
Davis, 1965, p. 100) "proposed" the "question of the relationship between 
effective calculability and 2-definability." He definitely asserted their 
column, line 21 from bottom, "retain" should be "contain." Page 63, left-hand column, line 4 
from bottom, "1944" should be "1954." Page 64, left hand column, bottom line, "A0 ~'' should 
be "A ,0 ,, 
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equivalence to his student Kleene, and he suggested to G6del in conversation 
that effective calculability simply be defined to be 2-definability. G6del 
indicated that he found Church's proposal "throughly unsatisfactory." The 
discussion took place around the time that G6del (1934) was giving his 
lectures. Church tells us that in the conversation "it developed that there was 
no good definition of effective calculability." Very near the beginning of 
G6del's lectures, in connection with what we have called G6del's Thesis, 
appears the statement 13"... the notion of finite computation is not defined." 
It is certainly tempting to imagine that there is a connection here. But it 
seems useless to speculate whether the conversation may have developed out 
of G6del's lectures, or whether G6del may have been stimulated by the 
conversation to bring up these matters in his lectures. In his cited letter to 
Kleene, Church wrote, speaking of G6del, "Evidently it occurred to him later 
that Herbrand's definition of recursiveness, which had no regard to effective 
calculability, could be modified in the direction of effective calculability, and 
he made this proposal in his lectures. ''~4 The question of the equivalence of 
the class of these general recursive functions with the effectively calculable 
functions was implicitly raised in "G6del's Thesis," and, as we have seen, 
explicitly raised by G6del in conversation with Church. Nevertheless, G6del 
was not convinced by the available evidence, and remained unwilling to 
endorse the equivalence of effective calculability, either with recursiveness or
with 2-definablity. He insisted (as Church later reported to Kleene) that it 
was "thoroughly unsatisfactory" to define the effectively calculable functions 
13 With regard to this statement, I asked in a letter to Kleene, "Did the statement of
footnote 3of G6del's 1934 lectures ... occur in the oral presentation asearly as its position in 
the text suggests ...?" Kleene replied (emphasis his): "It very likely did .... But I can't be 
positive." 
14 Thus Church had concluded that G6del thought of his "general" definition of recursive 
function only after his discussion of effectiveness with Church. Concurring with this 
conclusion, Kleene (1981) in his introductory abstract writes, "The notion of '2-definability' 
was the first of what are now accepted as equivalent exact mathematical descriptions of the 
class of functions for which algorithms exist." Perhaps thinking of the order of publication 
(and accepting the Kleene-Rosser mimeographed notes on G6del's lectures as a publication), 
Turing (1939; Davis, 1965, p. 160) wrote, "Such a definition [i.e., of an effectively calculable 
function] was first given by G6del at Princeton in 1934 ...." It should perhaps be noted that if 
it is a question of simply giving an "exact mathematical description of the class" as opposed 
to singling out the class as consisting of the "functions for which algorithms exist," then the 
class (or more accurately, the corresponding class of relations) is already to be found in 1931 
in G6del's notion of a relation being entseheidungsdefinit (p. 189 of the German original), or 
decidable (Davis, 1965, p. 26). 
Although it is certainly interesting to attempt o recover the order of events in this 
fascinating drama of ideas, what is much more interesting than who did what first is the 
remarkable fact that all of the proposed answers to the question: "Which functions are effec- 
tively calculable?" turned out to be correct and equivalent to one another. 
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to be some particular class without first showing that "the generally accepted 
properties" of the notion of effective calculability necessarily lead to this 
class. As we shall see, it was not until Turing's work became known that 
G6del was willing to concede that this difficulty had been overcome. 
Meanwhile, Church and Kleene each proved that all 2-definable functions 
are recursive. Church submitted an abstract of his work on March 1935, 
basing himself on recursiveness rather than 2-definability. By the end of June 
1935, Kleene had shown that every recursive function is 2-definable, after 
which Church (1936) was able to put his famous work into its final form. 
Thus while G6del hung back because of his reluctance to accept he evidence 
for Church's thesis available in 1935 as decisive, Church (who after all was 
right) was willing to go ahead, and thereby to launch the field of recursive 
function theory. 
Church was immediately aware of the significance of this work for the 
possibility of obtaining unsolvability results for problems of independent 
mathematical interest. The main unsolvability result obtained in Church 
(1936) was for a problem in the ~,-calculus (that of determining whether or 
not a given formula can be "converted" into a formula in so-called "normal" 
form). Church emphasized that this problem "appears to be of the same 
class as ... problems of number theory and topology .... The temptation is 
strong to reason by analogy that other important problems of this class may 
also be unsolvable." Indeed, Post's unsolvability proof (1947) for the word 
problem for semigroups was the result of a suggestion by Church that this 
was an appropriate problem on which to try Post's combinatorial methods. 
It is also worth noting that Church calls the identification of effective 
calculability with recursiveness a "definition." The use of the word "thesis" 
in this connection was proposed by Kleene (1943; Davis, 1965, p. 274) 
much later. As we shall see, for reasons not unrelated to G6del's scruples, 
Post was greatly opposed to speaking of Church's thesis as a "definition." 
4. TURING MACHINES AND G:()DEL'S THINKING 
Turing's model of computation is of course very well known to computer 
scientists. In a "postscriptum" to his 1934 lecture notes which G6del 
prepared for (Davis 1965), G6del made it clear that in his view, Turing's 
work was of fundamental importance in establishing the validity of Church's 
thesis. G6del stated 
Yuring's work gives an analysis of the concept of "mechanical procedure" (alias 
"algorithm" or "computation procedure" or"finite combinatorial procedure"). This 
concept is shown to be equivalent with that of a "Turing machine." (Davis, 1965, 
p. 72) 
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In a footnote that references Turing's work and "the almost simultaneous 
paper by E. L. Post" (1936), G6del goes on to say 
As for previous equivalent definitions of computability, which, however, are 
much less suitable for our purposes, see A. Church [1936] .... One of these 
definitions i  given in ... these lectures. 
Thus what was crucial for G6del was Turing's "analysis of the concept of 
'mechanical procedure'"  which G6del insists shows ,this concept" to be 
"equivalent with that of a 'Turing machine'." 
Turing did his work (1936-1939) in England entirely independently of the 
related research being done in Priceton. As Kleene (1981), p. 61 stated, 
Turing learned of the work at Princeton on 2-definability and general recur- 
siveness just as he was ready to send off his manuscript, to which he then added an 
appendix outlining a proof of the equivalence of his computability to )~- 
definability." 
Turing's "analysis" (1936-1937; Davis, 1965, pp. 135-138) is a 
remarkable piece of applied philosophy in which, beginning with a human 
being carrying out a computation, he proceeds, by a process of elimination 
of irrelevant details, through a sequence of simplifications, to an end result 
which is the familiar model consisting of a finite state device operating on a 
one-way infinite linear tape.15 In the letter from Church to Kleene which we 
have been citing, Church says of G6del, "His only idea at the time was that 
it might be possible, in terms of effective calculability as an undefined 
notion, to state a set of axioms which would embody the generally accepted 
properties of this notion, and to do something on that basis." Now, this is 
very much in line with what Turing accomplished. Although his treatment 
was not "axiomatic" in any formal sense, he did manage to show that 
"generally accepted properties" of effective calculability lead inevitably to a 
definite class of functions (which subsequently turned out to be the same as 
the 2-definable or recursive functions). It is therefore not difficult to see why 
Turing's work was so crucial for G6del. (For another discussion of some of 
these matters, see Wang (1974, pp. 81-99). 
Turing's analysis leads to what we may call 
TURING'S THESIS. Every algorithm can be programmed on a one-tape 
Turing machine. 
Turing's paper contains a great deal of interesting material in addition to 
his analysis, including the unsolvability of the halting problem and the 
15 This analysis is still very much worth reading. I regard my having failed to mention this 
analysis in my introduction to Turing's paper in Davis (1965) as an embarrassing omission. 
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decision problem for first order logic, as well as the now familiar 
construction of a universal Turing machine. 16 
Independent of Turing's work, but not of the work in Princeton, Emil Post 
(1936; Davis, 1965, pp. 289-291) formulated yet another equivalent version 
of computability which is extremely close to Turing's. Post's formulation 
used a two-way infinite tape or "symbol space" and lists of instructions 
(today we would call them "programs") rather than finite-state automata. In 
his paper, Post took strong exception to Church's used of the word 
"definition" in his statement of his "thesis." He emphasized that the purpose 
of his formulation "... is not only to present a system of a certain logical 
potency but also, in its restricted field, of psychological fidelity." "Church's 
identification of effective calculability with recursiveness" is characterized as
a "working hypothesis." Post continued in a footnote, 
Actually the work already done by Church and others carries this identification 
considerably beyond the working hypothesis tage. But to mask this identification 
under a definition hides the fact that a fundamental discovery in the limitations of 
the mathematicizing power of Homo Sapiens has been made and blinds us to the 
need of its continual verification. 
Post proposed a program of developing "wider and wider formulations" 
maintaining "psychological fidelity" all of which could presumably be shown 
to be "logically reducible" to the present formulation. The success of this 
program would "change this hypothesis not so much to a definition or to an 
axiom but to a natural law." 
Our discussion of G6del's ideas would not be complete without mention of 
his notion of a function being computable ("rechenbar") in a formal system. 
On June 19, 1935, iv G6del, having returned briefly to Austria, gave a collo- 
quium talk at the University of Vienna, an abstract of which has been 
published (G6del, 1936). The main content of the paper is a "speedup" 
theorem for the length of proof of propositions in a formal system. The 
precise statement of the theorem uses the notion of a function O(x) being 
"computable in" a formal system S, which G6del defines as meaning that "to 
each numerical m there corresponds a numeral n such that ¢t(m)= n is 
provable in S." G6del defines a sequence S~, $2,... of formal systems each 
stronger than the preceding and speaks of functions being computable in S i 
~6Turing's universal machine contains serious bugs. See Post (1947; Davis, 1965, 
Appendix, pp. 299 303). 
~v The original gives the date of this talk as June 19, 1934. I am indebted to John W. 
Dawson, Jr. for calling my attention to his realization teat this must have been a 
typographical error. As he explained, "That it is a mistake is indicated by the conflict between 
the dates and the colloquium session numbers; e.g., the 80th session met June 1 I, 1934, while 
the session at which G6del presented his length-of-proof result was the 92nd, which must have 
been much more than 8 days later." 
643/54/1-2/2 
16 MARTIN DAVIS 
as though the notion were really dependent on i. However, while correcting 
the printer's proofs, G6del (Davis, 1965, p. 83) added the "remark" 
It may also be shown that a function which is computable in one of the systems 
S i or even in a system of transfinite type, is already computable in S 1. Thus, the 
concept "computable" is in a certain definite sense "absolute," while practically all 
other familiar metamathematical oncepts (e.g. provable, definable, etc.) depend 
quite essentially on the system with respect o which they are defined. 
It would be of great interest o known just when G6del first realized that 
"computability" in this sense is "absolute." Evidently not at the time of his 
Princeton 1934 lectures, since they preceded his Vienna talk. The 
absoluteness result is a trivial consequence of Kleene's normal form theorem, 
but it is easy to imagine how G6del could have obtained it without knowing 
the normal form theorem. (It can be proved in two lines, using the methods 
of G6del (1931), that a function 0 is computable in any one of the systems 
S i if and only if the predicate y=O(x)  can be expressed in the form 
(3z)R(x,y,z), where R is a primitive.recursive pr dicate.) In G6del's 
address (1946) before the Princeton University Bicentennial Conference, he 
emphasized the significance of this absoluteness: 
Tarski has stressed in his lecture (and I think justly) the great importance of the 
concept of general recursiveness (or Turing's computability). It seems to me that 
this importance is largely due to the fact that with this concept one has for the first 
time succeeded in giving an absolute definition of an interesting epistemological 
notion, i.e., one not depending on the formalism chosen. In all other cases treated 
previously, such as demonstrability or definability, one has been able to define them 
only relative to a given language, and for each individual language it is clear that 
the one thus obtained is not the one looked for. For the concept of computability 
however, although it is merely a special kind of demonstrability or decidability the 
situatien is different. By a kind of miracle it is not necessary to distinguish orders, 
and the diagonal procedure does not lead outside the defined notion. 
It should be mentioned also that Church (1936; Davis, 1965, 
pp. 101-102) defines a function being "calculable within" a logic exactly in 
the manner G6del did and notes that all functions calculable within a logic 
are recursive. 
5. PARTIAL FUNCTIONS 
Constructivists in mathematics are those who insist that proofs of 
existential propositions are only correct insofar as they provide constructions 
of the objects whose existence is asserted. If "construction" is taken to mean 
"algorithm," then the relevance of Church's thesis to constructivism is clear. 
However, the definitions of 2-definable function, recursive function, Turing 
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computable function, etc. are all then subject to criticism by constructivists 
on the grounds of circularity. To take the example of general recursiveness: a 
function f(x) is general recursive if there exists a system of equations E 
which, for each nonnegative integer value of x, leads to a unique value fo r f  
by "appropriate" substitutions in the equations. That is, for every x, there 
must be a suitable derivation from E. To a constructivist, his means that 
there is a "construction" for obtaining such a derivation from a given x. If 
"construction" means "algorithm," this means that the derivation is effec- 
tively calculable from x. Thus our precise explication of effective 
calculability turns out to depend on the very notion purportedly being 
explained. Church (1936, footnote 10; Davis, 1965, p. 95) dealt with this 
criticism at the outset by simply informing the constructivist that "... he 
should take the existential quantifer which appears in our definition of a set 
of recursive quations in a constructive sense. What the criterion of construc- 
tiveness shall be is left to the reader." Not surprisingly, this eminently 
sensible suggestion did not end the debate. 
With hindsight, it is not hard to see that the difficulty comes from 
considering only total functions. It was Kleene (1938) in his remarkable 
paper who noted that every set of equations can be used to compute apartial 
function. There is no trace of circularity, even for a constructivist, in the 
definition of partial recursive function. Of course, from the point of view of 
recursive function theory, the nonconstructive element in the definition of 
recursive function simply reflects the fact that the class of systems of 
equations (or equivalently, of Turing machines) which determine total 
functions is not a recursive set.18 
Following Webb (1980, pp. 218-219), we can formulate Kleene's key 
insight, which has played a vital role in the further development of the field 
as 
KLEENE'S THESIS. Every mechanically computable partial function is 
partial recursive. 
It is only in terms of partial recursive functions that a proper statement of 
the famous recursion theorem is possible. Kleene (1938) contains a short 
proof of the recursion theorem, but Kleene was led to the statement by a 
form of the recursion theorem which he had previously developed in the 
context of the 2-calculus under the name circular definition.~9'z° 
J8 It is, of course, a complete H 2 set. 
~9 See Kleene (1936b). For a penetrating discussion of the role of the recursion theorem in 
buttressing Church's thesis, see Webb (1980, pp. 212-219). 
20 It is difficult for those who have learned about recursive functions via a treatment that 
emphasized partial functions from the outset to realize just how important Kleene's 
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6. POST'S WORK 1920--1922 
So far we have been discussing work that was done in the period 
1931-1938. But Emil Post's research in the early 1920s, unpublished at the 
time, anticipated much of this later work. Moreover, Post's work developed 
in terms of formal structures which have proved extremely important in 
computer science. In his 1920 doctoral dissertation, Post (1921b)discussed 
formal logical systems as combinatorial mathematical calculi in the modern 
sense for the first time, and proved some theorems about what we would 
today call the propositional calculus. 
Although none of those theorems were very hard, what was interesting 
was that Post quite clearly and consciously took the propositional calculus 
as a combinatorial calculus as an object of study. In particular he solved the 
decision zl problem for the propositional calculus. That is, he provided an 
algorithm for determining whether or not a given string was derivable from 
the axioms using the permitted rules. The algorithm was just the truth table 
method which he proved equivalent to derivability. He went on from there to 
attempt to get algorithms for more extensive systems. At that time 
Whitehead and Russell had recently completed their immense work "Prin- 
cipia Mathematica" in which they had shown in gory detail how to develop 
the basis of classical mathematics in a logical calculus. What Post tried to 
do, partly anticipating Hilbert's later efforts, was to find algorithms for wider 
and wider subsystems of "Principia Mathematica," and thereby to mechanize 
mathematics. Whereas Hilbert and his school went on to approach the 
decision problem for quantification theory semantically, Post evidently felt 
that was not a promising direction because the combinatorial intricacies of 
predicate logic were too great to penetrate in that manner, and what he 
proposed instead was to simplify by generalization. That is, he proposed to 
abstract from the kind of rules that occur in quantification theory to obtain a 
class of rules which included them. Then he could seek algorithms for 
solving the decision problem for arbitrary combinatorial calculi formulated 
using these more general rules, and thus incidentally for ordinary quan- 
tification theory. In the process, Post developed the basic notions underlying 
the modern formal theory of languages. 
Post's account (1965) of this early work was only published much later in 
the Davis anthology. 22 Actually, he considered three classes of combinatorial 
contribution was. Thus Rogers' excellent and influential treatise (1967, p. 12) contains an 
historical account which gives the impression that the subject had been formulated in terms of 
partial functions from the beginning. 
2~ Post called it the "finiteness" problem. 
22 Post, (1965, pp. 340-433). A fragment was published in Post (1943). 
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calculi, 23 each of which was formulated to be "canonical" in the sense of 
being expected to encompass the usual systems of symbolic logic being 
considered at that time, and, in particular, "Principia Mathematica."Quite 
early he was able to solve the decision problem for a very restricted case of 
one of these formulations, Post (1921a). Moreover, he was able to prove that 
all three canonical forms were equivalent to one another in the sense that a 
logic which could be reduced to one of these forms could be reduced to any 
of them, and he carried out the tedious "programming" project of reducing 
the predicate calculus part of "Principia Mathematica" to a system in 
canonical form. Post's early work led to a particular combinatorial problem, 
called the problem of tag, to which a number of different considerations 
seemed to lead. For example, he had tried to solve what apparently amounts 
to the unification problem for predicate calculus of order co, which is now 
known to be unsolvable. "The general problem proving intractable, succesive 
simplifications thereof were considered, one of the last being this problem of 
'tag'," Post (1965, p. 370). Also, attempts to extend the results of Post 
(1921a) again led "essentially to the selfsame problem of 'tag'. A solution 
thus appeared as a vital stepping stone in any further progress...." We may 
explain"tag" as follows: 
A tag system consists of an alphabet 22, a map 0 of 22 into Z*, and a 
positive integer k. Given such a tag system and a string w C Z* which 
begins with the symbol a C 22 we obtain a new derived string by forming the 
concatenated string wO(a ) and then deleting the first (leftmost) k symbols 
from this new word. (If there are fewer than k symbols, the derived string is 
empty.) The problem of tag is that of the behavior of the sequence of strings 
obtained by iterating this derived string operation. In one form it is to seek 
an algorithm to determine whether the empty string (and thereby termination 
of the process) is ever reached. In another, it is to determine for an arbitrary 
string whether it will be reached. 
Post made the problem of tag his "major project" during the tenure of his 
postdoctoral fellowship at Princeton for 1920-21. The problem proved unex- 
pectedly difficult. Post only managed to solved the problem for the case 
k ~< 2, ]22t ~ 2, and "even this ... involved considerable abor" (1965, p. 372). 
Going beyond this "led to an overwhelming confusion of classes of cases, 
with the solution of the corresponding problem depending more and more on 
... number theory. Since it had been our hope that the known difficulties of 
number theory would, as it were, be dissolved in the particularities of this 
more primitive form of mathematics, the solution of the general problem of 
~tag' appeared hopeless .... " The spacial case 22 = {0, 1 }, k = 3, 0(0)= 00, 
0(1) = 1 101 already proved intractible, and indeed, still seems to be open! Of 
course, as we now know, the problem of tag is unsolvable, Minsky (1961). 
23 One of these occurs already in his dissertation. 
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It was after this "frustration" that Post, in the summer of 1921, carried 
out his reduction to the third of his three canonical forms, and we now 
proceed to describe this third form. The basic idea was that of canonical 
production which we explain using contemporary terminology. Let 22 be an 
alphabet whose elements we call terminals. In addition to terminals, we use 
other symbols called nonterminals. Here nonterminals will be P with or 
without subscripts. A canonical production has the form 
g l0P l l  g l lP12 ""  P in  I g ln  l 
g20P21 g21P22 "'" P2n2g2~2 _~ hlPr~s h2Pr2s2 ... hiPrtsthl+ l. 
: . . .  
gkoPklgklP~2 "'" Pk~kgk~ 
Here all the g's and h's belong to Z* and the P's are nonterminals. 
Moreover, the subscripts ris i are such that 
l <~ r i <~ k, O <~ s i <~ nri, 
so that the Prisi all already appear on the left. We think of the above 
production as permitting a transition from k given "premises" on the left to a 
"conclusion" on the right, where the P's are to be thought of as replaced by 
particular elements of Z*. Now a canonical system is given by a finite set of 
axioms or primitive assertions which are themselves elements of S* together 
with a finite set of canonical productions. Such a canonical system generates 
a subset of Z*, namely the set of all strings which can be obtained from the 
axioms by iteratively applying the canonical productions of the system. A 
subset of S* generated in this manner by some canonical system, we may 
call a canonical set. As we have indicated, Post believed that the notion of 
canonical production was so general that the set of theorems of "Principia 
Mathematica" or any other system of logic would form a canonical set. His 
work had already shown that the set of theorems of the predicate calculus 
part of "Principia Mathematica" was a canonical set. But now he went on to 
prove that every canonical set could be obtained from a canonical system in 
a particularly simple (deceptively simple as it has turned out) normal form. 
A normal production is a canonical production of the special form 
gP ~ Ph. 
A normal system is a canonical system with a single axiom and only normal 
productions, and a normal set is a set which can be generated by a normal 
system. 
In 1921, Post obtained the following remarkable result which was finally 
published in Post (1943): 
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Posx's REDUCTION THEOREM. If C is a canonical set, C~_Z* ,  then 
there is an alphabet A @ Z and a normal set N % A* such that C = N n X*. 
Thus to solve the decision problem for the entire class of canonical 
systems it sufficed to do so for the much simpler class of normal systems. 
But this realization cast an entirely new light on Post's difficulties with 
"tag," For normal systems are very close indeed to the "seemingly special 
form of 'tag'" (1965, p. 373), and normal systems must code the full 
complexity of canonical systems and hence, presumably of "Principia 
Mathematica" in which all of classical mathematics can be embedded! 
"... the difficulty of 'tag' is no longer surprising" (1965, p. 401). And then, 
"... a fuller realization of the significance of the previous reductions led to a 
reversal of our entire program" (1965, p. 402). 
The use of canonical systems as a method for "generating" sets of strings 
led Post to ask what the most general "finite-process" for generating a set of 
strings could be. The mathematical generality of "Principia Mathematica" 
together with its apparant reducibility to a canonical system led Post to 
conclude that with canonical systems he had already attained full generality. 
Combining this conclusion with Post's Reduction Theorem, Post (1965, 
p. 405) was led to what we may call 
POST'S THESIS. Any set of  strings on an alphabet F_, which can be 
generated by a finite process is of  the form NAZ* ,  where N is a normal set 
on an alphabet A ~_ 2Z. 
By a straightforward application of the Cantor diagonal method, Post was 
now led to conclude "... there is no finite method which would uniformly 
enable us to tell of an arbitrary normal system and arbitrary [word] on the 
letters thereof whether that [word] is or is not generated by [that] ... system" 
(1965, p. 407). Post further was able to conclude that no system of symbolic 
logic (including "Principia Mathematica") could be complete with respect o 
the class of propositions that assert hat given strings are generated by given 
normal systems (1965, p. 415). 
How convincing did Post think all of this was? He wrote, "The 
correctness of this result is clearly entirely dependent on the trustworthiness 
of the analysis leading to the above generalization" (1965, p. 407), i.e. to 
what we have called Post's thesis. Of this analysis, Post (1965, p. 408) 
complained that "... it is fundamentally weak in its reliance on ... 'Principia 
Mathematica' ...." And, he evidently felt that the very incompleteness of
"Principia Mathematica" to which the analysis led undermined its suitability 
as a basis for such an analysis. Post felt that "... for full generality a 
complete analysis would have to be made of all possible ways in which the 
human mind could set up finite processes for generating sequences." 
"Establishing ... the universal character of our characterization of an 
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arbitrary generated set of [strings] ... is not a matter for mathematical proof, 
but of psychological analysis of the mental processes involved in 
combinatory mathematical processes." As we have already seen, Post's 
"Formulation I" of 1936 also spoke of "psychological fidelity." 
It is not clear whether or not Post accepted Turing's analysis as an 
adequate "psychological analysis" of "finite processes," but it seems clear 
that the qualms which Post is expressing here are very much related to the 
considerations which made G6de124 feel that "definitions of computability" 
which preceded Turing's were "much less suitable for our purpose." 
Of course, normal sets are just what are now called recursively 
enumerable languages, and so Post's Thesis concerns recursively enumerable 
sets rather than computable functions. As such it escapes criticism from the 
point of view of constructivism for the same reasons that Kleene's Thesis 
does. 
Judging by the dates mentioned by Post (1965), he worked only 
sporadically on these problems during the 1920s. There evidently was a burst 
of activity in 1924, some work in 1925, and some in 1929. In addition to 
efforts to carry out the desired "psychological analysis," Post mentions a 
program to prove the incompleteness of "Principia Mathematica" without 
invoking his "thesis." I have reason to believe z5 that Post lectured at 
Columbia University on the incompleteness of "Principia Mathematica" 
during the 1920s. Post's work (1965) was originally submitted to the 
American Journal of Mathematics in 1941 and was rejected with the 
suggestion that a shorter paper confined to what was new in 1941 be 
submitted. Post complied and the result is his 1943 paper. 
During the 1920s Post made his living mostly by teaching in the New 
York City public high schools. He was plagued by recurring bouts of manic- 
depressive illness. At the time I was his student as an undergraduate at City 
College during the 1940s, he taught 16 hours per week and had no office or 
secretarial facilities. 
7. POSTSCRIPT 
Although Church's Thesis is nowadays hardly to be doubted, 26 the 
question of what evidence is required for acceptance of a "thesis" which 
attempts to give a precise characterization f some intuitive concept is very 
24 Footnote in Davis (1965, p. 72). 
25 From comments I heard J. F. Ritt make to Post in 1948. 
26 We are not concerned here with attempts o distinguish "mechanical procedures" (to 
which Church's thesis is held to apply) from a possibly broader class of "effective 
procedures." See for example Wang (1974, p. 89) and Webb (1980, pp. 219-238). 
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much with us. Particularly relevant to contemporary theoretical computer 
science is the 
KARP-COOK THESIS. A set o f  strongs is feasibly computable i f  and only 
i f  it is polynomial time computable. 
This thesis is closely connected with the tantalizing P ? NP  question. But 
is must be admitted that the evidence for the Karp-Cook Thesis is rather 
thin, and is far less than the evidence on the basis of which Church went 
ahead to assert his thesis and which G6del regarded as insufficient. The main 
evidence comes to this: a large class of problems for which "feasible" 
algorithms have been long sought in vain are all NP-complete. Thus if any 
one of these problems had a polynomial time algorithm, all of them would. 
And, it is argued, it is surely likely that if all of these problems had 
polynomial time algorithms, some of the efforts to find "feasible" algorithms 
would have succeeded. But in this form the argument begs the question, 
retaining its force only so long as we accept the Karp-Cook Thesis. For the 
"feasible" algorithms which people have sought have been O(n log n) or 
O(n 2) or at worst O(n3). There has not been extensive activity seeking 
O(n 1°°) algorithms! Thus it seems entirely possible, in the present state of 
knowledge, that all NP-complete problems have polynomial time algorithms 
although none has an algorithm which is feasible in any practical sense. 
Note added in proof Readers will also find of interest: CROSSLEY, J. N. (1975), 
Reminiscences of logicians, Lecture Notes in Mathematics 450 "Algebra and Logic," 
Springer-Verlag, 1975 New York/Berlin. 
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